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SHOULD THE IRS NEVER “TARGET” 
TAXPAYERS?  AN EXAMINATION OF THE IRS 
TEA PARTY AFFAIR 
Philip Hackney* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2012 and 2013, many congressmen and Tea Party organizations 
accused the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) of “targeting” the Tea 
Party and other conservative political organizations.1  The Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration (“IG”) issued a report in 2013 
that leant some credence to this claim.2  The IG report faulted the Service 
for its method of screening applications for exemption from income tax.3  
While the IG did not use the term target, it stated broadly that “[u]sing 
the names or policy positions of organizations is not an appropriate basis 
for [the Service to identify] applications for review by the team of 
                                                 
* James E. and Betty M. Phillips Associate Professor of Law at the Louisiana State 
University Law Center (formerly Senior Technician Reviewer in the Exempt Organizations 
Branch of the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS from August 2006 through April 2011, 
but did not work on any of the “Tea Party Cases”), J.D. LSU Law Center, B.A. Southern 
Methodist University, LL.M. in Taxation NYU School of Law.  I thank Ellen P. Aprill, Bryan 
T. Camp, Michael Coenen, William F. Funk, Linda Jellum, Leandra Lederman, Lloyd 
Mayer, Shu Yi Oei, James Puckett, Edward Richards, and Donald Tobin for their comments 
and/or discussions regarding this Article.  I also thank the 2014 SEALs Tax Discussion 
group and the Stetson Law School Faculty Workshop.  A big thank you to my research 
assistants Jeff Butler and Jena Kyle, and the LSU Law Library staff in helping me make this 
Article stronger than it otherwise would have been.  I also thank Valparaiso University 
Law School and its Law Review for hosting a wonderful symposium.  Finally, a huge thank 
you to my wife, Jill Coury Hackney, and my sons for putting up with me through all those 
long hours while I wrote away on this and other articles.  You guys mean the world to me.  
This piece is a part of the Valparaiso University Law School’s 2014 Symposium, titled 
“Money in Politics:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.”  For more pieces from the 
symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium on Money in Politics, 49 VAL. U. 
L. REV. (2015). 
1 See generally TAXPROFBLOG, http://taxprof.typepad.com/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PPR3-AL5L (providing editor Paul Caron’s best collection of all the 
stories regarding this Tea Party matter).  For instance, see Paul Caron, House Demands IRS 
Documents on Alleging Harassment of Tea Party Groups, TAXPROFBLOG (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/04/house-demands-irs-.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QNC7-JTLU, for the stories discussing congressmen and Tea Party 
groups alleging in 2012 that they were being targeted.  See Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, 
Days 1-100, TAXPROFBLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/ 
2014/10/the-irs-scandal-days-1-100.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M8CG-JM3T, for a 
collection of materials from 2013. 
2 Treas. Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-
Exempt Applications for Review, Ref. No. 2013-10-053, 7 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter IG 
Report]. 
3 Id. at 5. 
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specialists.”4  This Article seeks to determine whether any legal theories 
or ethical claims support this IG criticism.  It also seeks to determine if 
the Service acted inappropriately in this case.  This review finds with 
respect to the first issue that the IG criticism was too sweeping.  The 
Service may generally use names to screen applicants to achieve certain 
policy goals such as uniformity of the law or to focus on taxpayers that 
may be in violation of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”).  It should 
exercise its discretion with greater care though where the Code provision 
it is enforcing impinges on a fundamental constitutional right.5  On the 
second issue, this Article concludes that the Service had policy interests 
of both uniformity and potential violations of the Code when it utilized 
names in the Tea Party cases.  Its actions thus fell within the scope of its 
discretionary authority.  However, best practices would call for greater 
care from the Service when it is enforcing provisions that impact 
fundamental Constitutional rights. 
Little positive law exists to guide bureaucrats in exercising 
discretionary authority.6  This Article therefore looks to a number of 
disparate sources of law and professional guidance to try to identify 
legal and ethical norms that might apply to Service employees when 
choosing organizations to scrutinize.  The review demonstrates that 
courts and Congress provide the Service and agencies wide latitude in 
exercising its investigatory and enforcement functions.  For instance, the 
Supreme Court set a high standard for establishing a claim for selective 
enforcement.  It has stated “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in 
enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation . . . ,” there 
must be a showing that “the selection was deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.”7  Congress provides significant bureaucratic discretion to 
the Service in its revenue collecting function through the Anti-injunction 
                                                 
4 Id. at 7; see, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Linchpins of Liberty v. United States, 
No. 13-777 (Oct. 23, 2014) (providing the complaint against federal officials for targeting 
conservative groups for review of tax exemption). 
5 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (determining that selective enforcement is 
not unconstitutional); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2663, 2664 (2005) (discussing how reviewing courts and the Executive Branch should 
carefully handle constitutionally sensitive interests). 
6 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:  A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 
(1969) (stating that the author’s main focus is on how “to minimize injustice from exercise 
of discretionary power”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion:  The Next Stage, 92 YALE 
L.J. 1487, 1487 (1983) (providing a discussion of the lack of control over administrative 
agencies’ autonomy). 
7 Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456. 
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Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act.8  These judicial and legislative 
choices demonstrate a US democratic determination that greater justice 
is served by allowing the Service significant discretion in its choice in 
how to enforce the law within its jurisdiction.9 
Although much has been written about the question of how to 
maximize tax enforcement with limited resources, there has been a 
tendency to ignore administrative law issues in the field of tax.10  While 
tax scholars are now turning in earnest to consider the implications of 
administrative law on the administration of the Code, little has been 
written about any legal limitations on the Service’s selection of persons 
and entities for examination generally.11  Even less scholarship addresses 
the limitations on managing the Service’s exempt organizations 
applications process.12  This Article tries to fill that gap. 
                                                 
8 Cf. Kristin Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1760 
(2014) (suggesting that because the Service is often not collecting revenue, Congress should 
revisit its vast grant of injunctive protection to the Service). 
9 See infra Part III (discussing how the Court has shown a demonstrated commitment 
that an agency’s choice not to enforce is generally beyond review of a court). 
10 See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L. J. 
1625, 1625 (2014) (commenting that tax law was isolated from administrative law for 
decades).  For a discussion of efforts to maximize tax enforcement with limited resources, 
see Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325 (2014). 
11 See, e.g., Grewal, supra note 10, at 1625 (exploring how tax practice may be shaped by 
administrative law doctrines).  But see Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue 
Service:  A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (2001) (exploring the history 
of four efforts to reform the Service largely brought about because of frustration regarding 
a belief that the Service agents were abusively investigating taxpayers); Bryan T. Camp, 
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 246, 259 (2009) [hereinafter 
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration] (considering the positive and negative impact of 
automated data processing on audits and also the importance of perceived procedural 
justice on taxpayer compliance); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the 
Internal Revenue Service to be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 411–12 (1985) (examining the 
administrative duty of consistency); Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency:  The 
Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 563–
64 (2009) [hereinafter An IRS Duty of Consistency] (proposing an amendment to the Code as 
a solution to the consistency dilemma); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal 
Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 531, 532–35 (2005) (discussing the IRS’ duty of consistency as applied in several court 
cases).  Also, more recently, a number of scholars have begun to consider the Service’s 
choice not to enforce in general. For instance, see Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical 
Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
12 However, after the Tea Party matter, several authors have analyzed some factors that 
might have led to the problem.  See Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and 
Administrative Discretion, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41, 51 (2013) (considering various 
controls that could be improved upon by the Service in carrying out its administrative 
discretion in managing its EO determinations program); Donald B. Tobin, The 2013 IRS 
Crisis:  Where Do We Go from Here?, TAX ANALYSTS 1120, 1120 (2014) (recommending clearer 
regulations defining the boundaries of political activities for social welfare organizations, 
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Kenneth C. Davis speaks of the “discretionary justice that is beyond 
the reach of both judicial review and trial-type hearings,” in his classic 
title Discretionary Justice.13  By discretion, Professor Davis means a public 
officer’s “discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him 
free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.”14  
Importantly, this space includes many acts of a public officer that are not 
specifically directed by positive law.  The question of how an agency 
should fairly choose organizations to review with greater rigor typically 
lies in this discretionary space that is generally, although not completely, 
beyond the reach of judicial review.  The scope of this discretion in the 
case of the Service in its investigatory stage is especially large given the 
inquisitorial nature of tax administration, where the regulatory agency is 
charged with identifying taxpayers who are subject to tax.15 
To put this question into concrete context, consider a couple of 
hypotheticals.  Assume that instead of looking at organizations to 
determine if they were engaged in too much political campaign activity, 
the Service was reviewing the applications of charities engaged in 
bilking the parents of disabled children.  Assume further that the name 
of the charities identified were either “Acme Charity, Inc.” or “Acme 
Foundation, Inc.”  Assume agents identified four of these charities with 
these two different names applying for exemption, and also on 
examination, noticed that the Service had accidentally granted two 
others exempt status.  Under these circumstances, we should expect the 
Service would search its computer system to identify any other “Acme 
Charity, Inc.” or “Acme Foundation, Inc.” in its applications system.  
Doing anything less would probably be malpractice on the part of the 
Service.  However, with this approach, the Service would be using 
names for screening purposes in the determinations process.  Yet, this 
process would not be problematic at all, legally or ethically.  Why should 
it be any different in the case of examining whether organizations that 
might be engaged in too much political campaign intervention?   
                                                                                                             
but arguing that the better solution is to pass broad based campaign finance disclosure 
laws removing the necessity of the Service to make decisions on political activities of 
exempt organizations); George K. Yin, Saving the IRS, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 22, 23 (2014) 
(arguing that we should increase the transparency of the EO determinations function by 
requiring the public disclosure of more determinations-related documents such as the 
application of exempt organizations). 
13 DAVIS, supra note 6, at 4. 
14 Id. 
15 See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm 
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. LAW REV. 1, 19–20 (2004) 
(describing tax administration as inquisitorial). 
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A slightly different hypo is important as well.  In this one, assume 
again that the Service happens to notice ten applications from 
organizations all named New Charity, Inc.  Assume further that these 
organizations are engaging in a relatively new activity, and that the 
Service is not certain how the tax-exempt law will impact this new 
activity.  If the Service directed its agents to send all of these applications 
to one agent or one group of agents to make certain the applications are 
worked in a uniform manner, we would think this a good use of limited 
resources as well.  Yet again, the pulling of the applications would be 
based on name alone.  Agents would screen for any New Charity, Inc. 
application without any indication that there might be a violation of the 
Code.  This is also closely akin to the Tea Party cases, and yet fully 
unobjectionable. These two hypotheticals work to show that there is a 
common sense notion that the Service should be able to use names in 
screening applications for exemption.  
That leaves us with the second question—was the IG correct to 
criticize the Service for utilizing names to screen in this particular case?  
There is no law that tells the Service how it must review applications 
from organizations seeking to be recognized as exempt from income tax.  
The Service followed its own procedures that apply to its operation of its 
application system.16  Thus, there is no sub-constitutional law that 
demonstrates the Service violated the law by screening applications 
when it utilized the Tea Party-related names.  Furthermore, the 
predominant way to establish a legal violation in this instance would be 
to establish that the Service violated equal protection principles by 
engaging in selective enforcement.  But generally, that is only shown 
where the Service both selected and enforced the law that impacted a 
constitutional right against one group and not against others.  The 
evidence suggests that the Service selected and enforced the law against 
many other groups.17  Thus, the IG cannot point to a particular legal 
violation by the Service.  However, from an ethical standpoint, the 
bureaucrats of the agency have a higher standard of care when utilizing 
screening techniques when the law enforced implicates a constitutional 
right.  Here, the Service bureaucrats did not act with adequate care in 
utilizing names in this case, which arguably involved the fundamental 
constitutional right to speak. 
This Article recognizes that the IG fulfills a special role that is 
different than a role filled by courts in reviewing agency action or 
                                                 
16 See IG Report, supra note 2, at 5 (outlining the Service’s procedures in making the 
determinations). 
17 See id. at 8 (providing a breakdown of the potential political cases, including 
organizations with Tea Party, 9/12, or Patriots in the name). 
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Congress in passing legislation.  However, this Article concludes that the 
IG can do real harm to Service function when it fails to be more precise 
in its criticism.18  The IG should have done more to identify the legal or 
ethical basis upon which it bases its criticism.  That would have gone a 
long way to narrowing the basis of criticism in this case. 
Part II of this Article details the Service determination and 
examination processes.19  The determination process is the application 
system the Service was administering when it reviewed the Tea Party 
applications.20  The examination process is the process of auditing 
taxpayers.21  These are both relevant to the Tea Party story to understand 
the challenges the Service faces in administering and enforcing the Code.  
Part III describes the law under the Code applicable to social welfare 
organizations, the primary organization involved in the Tea Party 
matter.22  It is important in the sense that it establishes the predicate that 
the Service had good reason to review applications by Tea Party 
organizations with greater scrutiny than other applications.  Part IV 
reviews legal and ethical principles that should apply to the Service 
when it reviews applications for tax-exemption.23  While this Article 
concludes that the use of names to screen applications is allowed, and 
necessary, and it finds that when the Service is enforcing a provision that 
impacts constitutional rights, the Service has a duty to act with a high 
degree of care.24  Part V applies these principles to the Tea Party matter.25  
The analysis finds that the Service did not violate any legal rules, but 
should have acted with greater care in the use of screening techniques 
because the particular Code section involved implicated important 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association.26  Finally, Part 
VI concludes that the Service did not engage in a legal violation, but 
                                                 
18 See infra Part V.B (providing recommendations to avoid a similar situation in the 
future). 
19 See infra Part II (detailing the Service’s processes used to target conservative 
organizations). 
20 See infra Part II.A (explaining the determination process). 
21 See infra Part II.B (discussing the examination process). 
22 See infra Part III (providing a discussion of the legal requirements for social welfare 
organizations under the Code). 
23 See infra Part IV (reviewing legal and ethical principles as a possible legal basis for 
finding an issue with the determinations process). 
24 See infra Part V.B (recommending that the Service act with a higher standard of care 
when reviewing applications for exemption). 
25 See infra Part V (applying the analysis to the Tea Party situation). 
26 See infra Part V.B (arguing that a higher standard of care must be exercised by the 
Service when Constitutional rights are implicated). 
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rather mismanaged the application process and failed to meet an ethical 
standard.27 
II.  SERVICE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION APPLICATION SYSTEM AND 
EXAMINATION FUNCTION 
This Part first discusses the exempt organization application system 
the IG criticized and then considers the examination system.  The exempt 
organizations division of the Service (“EO”) reviews applications from 
nonprofit organizations seeking to be recognized as exempt from income 
tax in a process called the determinations process (“EO determinations 
process”).28  The Service receives a high volume of paper applications 
annually, more than the Service apparently has the capacity to handle.29  
The Taxpayer Advocate listed as one of the most serious problems in 
2012 as the overextension of Service resources in the EO determinations 
process.30  Thus, the Service must make administrative and enforcement 
choices in managing the EO determinations process given its scarce 
resources.  Because the Service faces a very similar scarce resource 
challenge in its examinations process, this Part also reviews the related 
methods the Service has chosen to manage its examination process. 
A. Determinations Process 
A determination in EO refers to the process of reviewing an 
application from a nonprofit organization.31  These organizations file an 
application with the Service to be recognized as tax exempt under 
                                                 
27 See infra Part VI (concluding that the Service did not meet ethical standards when it 
targeted the Tea Party and other conservative political organizations). 
28 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (describing the list of tax exempt organizations); 26 
U.S.C. § 501(a) (creating a tax exemption for organizations recognized as exempt). 
29 The Service’s recent adoption of the new Form 1023EZ appears to be changing this 
problem. The Service has recently moved through a significant backlog of exemption 
applications.  Progress Update on Form 1023-EZ, IRS (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/ 
portal/site/irspup/menuitem.143f806b5568dcd501db6ba54251a0a0/?vgnextoid=44beb23f
06ffb410VgnVCM1000003b4d0a0aRCRD, archived at http://perma.cc/VMC5-86LL. 
30 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 Annual Report to Congress, 196–97, available at 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/SRX7-UEHU (discussing overextension of Service resources as a 
problem in 2012); Identification of EO Technical Cases, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (showing an overview of determination letters for exempt 
organizations). 
31 See, e.g., Overview, IRM 7.20.1.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/ 
irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (explaining determinations 
letters for exempt organizations). 
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section 501(a) because described in section 501(c) of the Code.32  A 
determination is a private letter ruling issued by the Service to a 
taxpayer that is only applicable to that taxpayer.33  No congressional 
statute or rule requires the Service to make these private rulings on an 
organization’s exempt status, and no rule requires the Service to provide 
such rulings in the case of social welfare organizations.  However, the 
Service has long accepted requests from taxpayers for a letter assuring 
the organization that the organization will be considered tax-exempt. 
Congress has effectively approved and adopted the application system 
of the Service with respect to charitable organizations that seek status 
under section 501(c)(3).34 
1. Very Brief History of the Determinations Process 
Dating back to the income tax of the Civil War, the Service has 
required nonprofit applicants to prove their charitable status to claim 
exempt status.35  With the enactment of the 1913 Income Tax, the Service 
enacted regulations to require that nonprofit organizations prove 
entitlement to exempt status.36  Under the initial system, an organization 
seeking exempt status had to provide evidence to employees of the 
Service, called local collectors, that the organization was entitled to 
exempt treatment.37  Tax regulations issued under the 1917 and 1921 Tax 
Act allowed any nonprofit organization seeking to avoid paying 
corporate income tax to file an affidavit with the collector in the district 
that the organization was located, setting forth the facts upon which the 
organization based its request for an exemption.38 
A collector had authority to make a determination on exemption 
unless the collector was in doubt.39  Thus, in the early years, the exempt 
determination was made in local field offices of the Service.  Collectors 
                                                 
32 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
33 See Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-1 I.R.B. 7 (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-irbs/irb14-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KKU9-64NL (setting out the 
definition of a letter ruling). 
34 See 26 U.S.C. § 508(a) (requiring organizations seeking to be recognized as charitable 
organizations to file a Notice with the Secretary of the Treasury). 
35 See Internal Revenue Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 279 (1866) (explaining an amendment 
exempted from tax “managers of any . . . charitable, benevolent, or religious association” 
upon proof to the local collector of taxation that the profits would be applied to the “relief 
of sick and wounded soldiers, or to some other charitable use”). 
36 T.D. 2693, 1918-1, C.B. 293; T.D. 3587, 1924-1, C.B. 247, 1924 WL 59031. 
37 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, section 111, 13 Stat. 279. 
38 See Treas. Reg. § 231, art. 511 (1922), available at http://www.constitution.org/tax/us-
ic/regs/Regs_45_revised_for_1918_act.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FV38-VGDW 
(discussing proof of exemption). 
39 Id. 
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were instructed to keep a list of organizations exempted from the 
corporate income tax and to occasionally inquire into whether these 
organizations continued to qualify for exemption.40 
The Service appears to have changed its affidavit system into a 
private letter ruling system in the 1940s.41  To claim an exemption, a 
taxpayer had to request a private ruling from the Service.42  Before 1954, 
all of these applications for private rulings were directed to the national 
office in Washington, DC instead of to local field employees like the 
original system.43  While in that year, the Commissioner provided 
authority in Revenue Ruling 54-164 to the District Directors to issue 
exemption letters in the field, it was not until fifteen years later that the 
directors began to develop expertise in this area.44 
The modern EO determinations system, described in more detail 
below, got its start in 1969 with the enactment of section 508 of the Code.  
That section requires charitable organizations to provide notice to the 
Service to be recognized as exempt from tax.45  While there are a number 
of other exempt organizations, such as voluntary employee benefit 
associations and certain trusts that are specifically required to provide a 
notice to the Service to be recognized as exempt, most organizations 
need not provide such a notice.46 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 See David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, THE COMM’N ON 
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS, VOL. 5, 2585 (1977), 
https://archives.iupui.edu/handle/2450/812, archived at http://perma.cc/5AR-HEPV 
(reviewing the history of exempt organizations); see also Rev. Proc. 59-31, 1959-2 C.B. 949 
(discussing the Service’s private letter ruling system); Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer 
Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service:  A Statement of Principles, NYU 20TH INST. ON 
FED. TAX 1–6 (1962) (detailing the history of the Service’s private letter ruling system from 
the enactment of the 1913 income tax to 1962). 
42 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2583 (discussing the history of exempt 
organizations); see also Rev. Proc. 59-31, 1959-2 C.B. 949 (discussing the Service’s private 
letter ruling system). 
43 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2584 (discussing the history of exempt 
organizations). 
44 See Rev. Rul. 54-164, 1954-1 C.B. 88 (noting the Commissioner’s thoughts); Ginsburg et 
al., supra note 41, at 2584 (discussing the number of years it took for directors to implement 
expertise training). 
45 See Tax Reform Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 91-172, Title I, § 101(a), 83 Stat. 494 (1969) 
(analyzing the notice required that needs to be given to the IRS for charitable 
organizations). 
46 FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 
32.03 (2012); I.R.S. Serv. Center Advice 200046038, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2000), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0046038.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/; e.g., 
Overview, IRM 7.25.1.1 (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025-
001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XPR4-42AS.  The overview provides that: 
Except for most organizations described in paragraphs (3), (9), or (17) 
of section 501(c), the Internal Revenue Code does not require 
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Practically, even before the change in statutory requirement to file, 
many charitable organizations filed notices with the Service in order to 
be listed in Treasury Publication 78.47  This is a list kept by the Service 
that provides notice that it recognizes a particular organization as 
exempt from income tax.48  A donor that contributes to an organization 
listed in Publication 78 can be assured that the Service will treat the 
contribution as a charitable contribution deductible under section 170.49  
There are many other benefits to a charitable organization that files an 
application with the Service to be recognized as exempt.50  The benefits 
to a noncharitable organization, however, such as a social welfare 
organization, are lesser.  The primary benefit is certainty of tax treatment 
and general greater ease of dealing with the Service. 
2. Current Determinations Process 
This Section describes the procedures the Service operates under to 
conduct the EO determinations process.  This is a description of the 
determinations process as it existed immediately before the Service made 
changes as a result of the Tea Party affair.  It discusses the procedural 
guidance to demonstrate the effort the Service has made to confine the 
procedural discretion of its agents.  Notably, this Section demonstrates 
that rather than ignoring its procedures, the Service appears to have 
followed its procedures in utilizing names to screen applications in the 
Tea Party matter. 
Part seven of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) publicly 
describes the Tax Exempt Government Entities (“TEGE”) internal 
                                                                                                             
organizations to apply for recognition of exemption. An organization 
qualifies for exemption if it meets the requirements of the Code.  
However, an organization is subject to tax until it establishes that it 
qualifies for exemption, and most organizations find that filing an 
application for recognition of exemption is the least burdensome way 
to establish that they qualify. 
Id. 
47 See Cumulative List, IRM 25.7.6 (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/ 
irm_25-007-006.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RC2E-QFUA (providing specifications 
for organizations to be included in Publication 78, which lists organizations that may 
receive tax deductible contributions). 
48 See Search for Charities, I.R.S., available at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-
Profits/Search-for-Charities, archived at http://perma.cc/57ZF-QPU9 (providing a search 
engine for a cumulative list of charitable organizations since Publication 78 is no longer 
published). 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Bazil Facchina, Evan Showell, & Jan E. Stone, Topics in Philanthropy:  Privileges 
& Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations:  A Catalog and Some Thoughts on Nonprofit 
Policymaking (1993) (cataloging benefits of nonprofit organizations qualified as exempt 
from federal income tax). 
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procedures for issuing certain rulings and agreements to employee plans 
and exempt organizations.  Other useful documents in understanding 
the determinations process as it existed include Revenue Procedure 2012-
9, Publication 557 Tax-Exempt Status for Your Nonprofit Organization, 
and the annual EO Work Plan.51 
Any nonprofit organization that wants to be recognized by the 
Service as exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the 
Code because described in section 501(c) of the Code may apply to the 
EO Determinations function headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio.52  The 
employees in Cincinnati are considered to be working in a field office 
rather than a national office.53  As will be seen though, the national office 
provides oversight and guidance to that field office.  Charitable 
organizations seeking recognition under section 501(c)(3) generally must 
file a Form 1023 to seek tax-exempt status.54  Other nonprofit 
organizations, such as social welfare organizations under section 
501(c)(4) and business leagues under section 501(c)(6), must file a Form 
1024 for tax-exemption recognition.55  There are now twenty-nine 
different types of rather complex organizations described in section 
                                                 
51 See Rev. Proc. 2012-9, 2012-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irb/2012-
02_IRB/ar10.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8PN-YTMV (noting that it is a useful 
document); IRS, IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT & FY 2013 WORK 
PLAN 1, 15–24, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/FY2012_EO_AnnualRpt_ 
2013_Work_Plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8REG-SM28 [hereinafter WORK PLAN] 
(reviewing the 2013 IRS Work Plan). 
52 See Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization, I.R.S. PUB. 557, 4 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4M5G-GJXE 
(noting the section 501(c) application process).  In general, organizations seeking a status 
other than 501(c)(3) need not actually apply to the service to be considered exempt from 
income tax.  Thus, a social welfare organization such as many of the Tea Party applicants 
could choose not to file with the Service.  However, there is some risk associated with that 
choice.  The Service could come back later and assert penalties and interest for failure to file 
taxes for a number of years.  See Exempt Organizations – Help from the IRS, I.R.S. (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Help-from-
the-IRS, archived at http://perma.cc/DM94-LB9V (providing customer service information 
for exempt organizations at the Service office in Cincinnati, Ohio). 
53 See Rev. Proc. 2013–9, 2013-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-
02_IRB/ar07.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SYT5-9GA7 (describing the Cincinnati 
office as a field office). 
54  See Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, I.R.S., available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7934-6T72 (taking note of the checklist). 
55 See Form 1024, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a), I.R.S., 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1024.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EUU8-3PBU 
(providing the tax-exemption form for welfare organizations and business leagues). 
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501(c).56  Organizations that are not explicitly included within section 
501(c) may also apply for an EO determination.57 
The Service receives 60,000 to 70,000 applications for recognition of 
exemption annually.58  These are all in paper form; there is no electronic 
means for filing the form.59  Form 1023 for charitable organizations 
consists of twelve pages and eight possible schedules.60  The recently 
developed Form 1023EZ for small charitable organizations is much 
shorter.61  Form 1024 consists of nineteen pages including schedules.62  In 
addition to the forms, an organization must attach articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, and numerous other supporting documents, such 
as financial data, explanations of answers, and publications.63  Thus, in 
some cases, a full application can be well over 100 pages. 
In putting this application process into context, it is important to 
note that nonprofit organizations, including social welfare organizations, 
are often deeply interrelated to other nonprofit organizations by person 
or idea.  For instance, there are over 2000 local units of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, many of which are 
organized as social welfare organizations.64  Similarly, with respect to the 
Tea Party-related organizations, there appear to be hundreds of 
organizations that are registered with the national Tea Party 
                                                 
56 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (listing the twenty-nine types of exempt organizations). 
57 See, e.g., § 521 (exempting farmers’ cooperatives from tax); § 527 (exempting political 
organizations from tax). 
58 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (noting the number of applications received); see 
also Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations (May 15, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501%28c%29-Organizations, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8DCT-WSWG [hereinafter Questions and Answers] (noting the number of 
applications received). 
59 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 24 (noting the current 1023 is only available in a 
paper format, but the Service is working to get the funds to allow the electronic completion 
of Form 1023). 
60 See Form 1023, supra note 54 (providing twelve pages of the actual form and eight 
possible schedules). 
61 Form 1023-EZ, Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, IRS (Jan. 28, 2015), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-1023EZ, archived at http://perma.cc/5TU2-RL8J. 
62 See Form 1024, supra note 55 (including nineteen pages of information and schedules 
that must be completed on Form 1024). 
63 See Form 1023, supra note 54 (providing a checklist of documents and information to be 
included with Form 1023). 
64 See NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/find-your-local-unit/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M6U-5CPP?type=imagen (providing access to local units); see, e.g., 
NAACP, Pittsburgh Branch Form 990, http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/25-
6086867/naacp-pittsburgh-branch.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3R3N-23UA 
(providing that the NAACP is a social welfare organization). 
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organization.65  Many of these have filed individual applications for 
exemption relying on support of the national tea party organization.66  
Other times, such as in the case of some supporting organizations, there 
is some tax shelter promoter who has encouraged the creation of highly 
similar organizations.67 
Based on 2012 data, there were about 875 employees of the 
approximately 90,000 Service employees working in the EO division.68  
Of those, 330 work in the Rulings and Agreements division, with about 
200 of those in the Cincinnati EO determinations office.69 This is the 
workforce for the Service to manage this application system.  EO Rulings 
and Agreements has jurisdiction to issue determination letters and ruling 
statuses to tax exempt organizations under sections 501(a) and 521, as 
well as a few other matters.70  Given the vast quantity of annual 
applications and the resources at the Service’s disposal, although the 
Service reviews every application, only a smaller set of organizations 
receive a closer look.71  The Service summarily approves some 
applications.72 
                                                 
65 See generally Locate a Local Tea Party Group, TEA PARTY COMMAND CTR. BLOGGER SPOT, 
http://teapartyorg.ning.com/page/tea-party-groups, archived at http://perma.cc/8HBJ-
FJ4U (listing over 700 Tea Party affiliates by state). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Takes on Tax Abuse by Charity Support Groups, N.Y. 
TIMES, at B1 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/ 
business/15charity.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3CJA-EXXF (“Lois G. Lerner, director 
of the exempt organizations division of the I.R.S., said the organizations that had been 
examined in the continuing investigation [of supporting organizations] were largely those 
linked to promoters that had been identified by other I.R.S. divisions.”). 
68 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 65 (noting the number of employees).  Interestingly, 
in 1977, when there were around 230,000 charitable organizations registered with the 
Service, around 1000 employees worked in the exempt organizations office (total of 71,000 
service employees).  The Service issued around 2000 total determination letters a year at 
that time.  See also Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2578, 2581, 2593 (examining the history 
of the number of employees). 
69 See Annual Information Returns, IRM 7.25.1.5 (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5GWU-
SEZR (explaining that the EO Examinations office has jurisdiction to examine exempt 
organizations). 
70 See Overview, IRM 7.20.1.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-
020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (noting the jurisdiction of 
determination letters). 
71 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing the screening system put in place to 
quickly process low risk applications). 
72 Id.  The Service recently developed Form 1023EZ recognizing this fact.  See Form 1023-
EZ, Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023ez.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/82DX-KAJG (presenting Form 1023-EZ).  It allows small organizations 
that meet certain requirements to file a smaller form and generally receive status much 
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A review of the IRM logically suggests that an employee reviewing 
applications first enters data from the application into the Service 
computer system, called the Letter Information Network User System 
(“LINUS”).73  The information entered into LINUS is additionally 
uploaded into the EO Determination System (“EDS”).74  From the IRM, it 
is not entirely clear how much information from the applications is 
included in LINUS, but considering the resources of the Service in EO 
determinations it appears likely that only a limited amount of 
information is actually input into this computer system.75  One would 
logically expect that the name of the organization, its address, and 
simple yes or no questions that populate the forms are transcribed.  
Information such as financial data and narrative descriptions may very 
well never be entered into the database.  If true, this would mean that the 
ability to search this system is likely quite limited in its scope and 
usefulness.  A name may well be the most useful data for searching 
purposes. 
In its 2012 Annual Report, EO states that it uses “screening” agents 
to divide applications into four different categories to process them most 
efficiently.76  It is not clear from EO descriptions whether the “screening” 
agents are reviewing the information in EDS or whether they are 
reviewing the actual application.  One presumes that it is the actual 
application and could perhaps involve simultaneous data entry.  The 
categories include:  (1) substantially complete applications where the 
initial reviewer is able to say the application can be quickly approved 
without further review; (2) applications that are not substantially 
complete; (3) applications where minor additional information is needed; 
and (4) applications where further development is needed to determine 
whether the organization meets tax-exempt status.77  The report states 
that 70% of 60,000 applications, or 42,000, fall into the first three 
categories and, as such, are closed within 120 days of receiving the 
                                                                                                             
quicker than most organizations.  This recognizes that many of these small organizations 
were being summarily approved anyway. 
73 See Overview, IRM 7.22.2.1 (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-
022-002.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AS5V-J5CF (reviewing the Service data entry 
procedures). 
74 See id. (providing the application process, generally including exhibits showing screen 
data captures). 
75 Id. 
76 See Determination Letter Processing Overview, IRM 7.20.2.1 (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-002r.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NLS4-
HW4E (observing that this function is done by Technical Screeners in the Cincinnati, Ohio 
office). 
77 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (examining the four categories). 
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application.78  That leaves approximately 28,000 applications falling into 
the unassigned category awaiting the attention of another agent to 
provide further development. 
If an application falls into this unassigned category, according to the 
Annual Report, the average wait time for EO to assign an agent to an 
application is five months.79  However, the annual report of the Taxpayer 
Advocate indicates that in 2012 the time before assignment was nine 
months.80  Additionally, in August 2013, the Service website stated that 
EO was assigning cases to agents that were received in April 2012.81  The 
Service no longer provides this information.  Its institution of Form 
1023EZ, along with automatic approval of applications from 
organizations willing to make certain commitments, appears to have 
generally cleared this significant backlog. 
The IRM directs Service agents on how to handle particular 
applications with some detail.82  When an application describes an 
organization that does not squarely fit within known legal precedent or 
describes an issue of national significance, the case is to be transferred to 
EO Technical.83  EO Technical is a group of approximately forty tax law 
specialists in Washington, D.C. that is a part of the EO Rulings and 
Agreements division.84  The IRM also lists twenty-one types of 
organization applications that must be transferred to these forty tax law 
specialists in EO Technical.85  Some of those include prepaid health 
plans, organizations that present issues of commercial type insurance, 
complex hospital and health care operations, credit unions, and 
insurance companies.86  Some of the other types of issues that the EO 
Technical group has likely had to deal with over the past five years 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See IRS, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE 196 (2012), 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/FHA7-VA9S (noting the months it takes to be assigned). 
81 Stalled Applications for Section 501(c)(3) Status:  Is it Time to Sue the IRS?, CAPLIN & 
DRYSDALE ATTORNEYS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.capdale.com/stalled-applications-for-
section-501c3-status-is-it-time-to-sue-the-irs, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ93-R47S. 
82 See Identification of EO Technical Cases, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-
VXTL (describing how the EO technical cases are identified and processed by certain 
offices). 
83 See id. (describing the process of more complicated applications). 
84 See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 6 (noting the number of tax specialists). 
85 See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-
VXTL (noting the types of organization applications that are sent to the national office). 
86 See id. (noting the many types of organizations that must be transferred to the forty tax 
specialist in Washington, D.C.). 
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include the social welfare organization issue associated with the Tea 
Party cases, credit counseling, down payment assistance, supporting 
organizations, donor advised funds, hospitals because of new rules in 
the Affordable Care Act, Mortgage Foreclosure Assistance, and Regional 
Health Information Organizations.87  Each of these types of cases either 
arose as a result of a change in the marketplace or a change in the law for 
exempt organizations.  They all present highly technical, challenging 
calls for someone who practices law in the area of exempt organizations.  
Not only is the law challenging, but the organizational structure 
typically involves substantial complexity as well. 
Also, long a part of the procedures in the Service has been a 
requirement that the field send certain challenging applications to the 
national office.88  The IRM long-restricted field authority by providing 
that key district offices must also refer to Washington, D.C. all 
applications for exemption that involve "matters of extensive public 
interest, that is those in which the organization, its officers, or its 
activities are likely to generate.”89  Today, the IRM reflects a similar 
sentiment directing “[c]ases where issues are . . . not covered by clearly 
established precedent because they may have significant regional or 
national impact,” to be sent to EO Technical.90  Presumably, the Tea 
Party organizations fit under that description.91  The IG speaks of a 
BOLO list used by the Service to ensure agents were identifying certain 
applications that should be sent to this EO Technical group.92  It is likely 
that the BOLO list was a way of ensuring that the matters of “public 
interest” or national impact were properly sent to EO Technical to ensure 
individuals with a higher level of expertise paid attention to these 
applications. 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2592 (explaining that certain difficult applications 
are sent to the national office). 
89 See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-
VXTL (noting the types of organization applications that are sent to the national office).  
The Service recently changed the TEGE organizational structure such that the national 
office will no longer review these applications in the normal course of business.  Rev. Proc. 
2015-9, Section 5, IRB 2015-2 (Jan. 12, 2015).  This recent revenue procedure does envision 
that determination letters are subject to some national review through EO Rulings and 
Agreements or the Office of the Chief Counsel.  Id. at Section 9. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See IG Report, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that “the Determinations Unit began 
developing a spreadsheet that would become known as the ‘Be On the Look Out’ listing” 
and was abbreviated by the IG as a BOLO listing). 
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Once an application is properly assigned, an agent must make a 
determination.  The agent can:  (1) decide the organization did not 
properly apply and reject the application; (2) request more information 
from the organization; (3) deny the request for exemption subject to 
certain procedures; or (4) grant the request and issue an exemption 
letter.93  The Service directs its employees to grant tax-exempt status only 
when an organization’s status fits well within established law under the 
Code.94  Courts hold that tax-exemption is a matter of legislative grace 
and is to be construed narrowly.95  Very few applications, however, are 
in fact denied.96 
3. Procedures for a Taxpayer to Challenge an EO Determination 
If the Service is going to deny an application, it will first issue a 
proposed adverse determination.  In that proposed denial, it will also 
inform the organization of its right to either appeal or protest that denial 
and request a conference to be heard.97  An organization submits an 
                                                 
93 See Determination Letter Processing of Exempt Organizations, IRM 7.20.2 (Aug. 24, 
2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-002r.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
NLS4-HW4E (reviewing the denial and acceptance options); see also Rev. Proc. 2012-9, § 7, 
2012-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irb/2012-02_IRB/ar10.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DWT4-P3DG (detailing the procedures available for an organization 
denied exempt status including the right to first receive a proposed denial and the right to 
protest that denial). 
94 See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-
VXTL (providing strict instructions for EO processing employees to follow when they 
process exempt organization applications). 
95 See, e.g., IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that tax exemption is a “matter of legislative grace” and therefore, it should be 
construed narrowly); Mut. Aid Ass'n of Church of the Brethren v. United States, 759 F.2d 
792, 794 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding tax exemption is a “matter of legislative grace” and is 
construed narrowly); Haswell v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 421, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (“Tax exemptions are matters of legislative grace and 
taxpayers have the burden of establishing their entitlement to exemptions.”). 
96 See, e.g., Rob Reich, Lacy Dorn & Stefanie Sutton, Anything Goes:  Approval of Nonprofit 
Status by the IRS, STANFORD CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOC’Y 8 (Oct. 2009), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/reichresearch/cgi-bin/site/wp-content/uploads/2009/ 
11/Anything-Goes-PACS-11-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8UMD-UD2M (finding in 
a recent study that the Service has annually denied between 0.74% and 2.17% of 
applications for charitable status during the late 1990s to 2008). 
97 See Rev. Proc. 2013-9, § 7, 2013-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-
02_IRB/ar07.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WDP8-HPPZ (explaining the denial and 
appeal procedures); Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 262–63 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S9XU-N9D3 
(providing the procedure to follow when an exempt status is denied). 
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appeal made to the appeals division of the Service (“Appeals”).98  
Appeals has the authority to override the proposed adverse 
determination.99  Additionally, if the organization submits a protest, the 
Service will review that protest and consider granting status.100  Where 
the Service determines the organization does not qualify, it will then 
issue a final adverse determination.101 
Congress limits the rights of taxpayers wishing to challenge actions 
of the Service.  Congress has long maintained the Anti-injunction Act to 
prohibit a suit against the Service “for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax.”102  The primary avenue to challenge 
Service action is through refund jurisdiction.103  A taxpayer must pay the 
tax to have access to a United States District Court or to the Federal 
Claims Court.104  Congress provides a taxpayer an avenue to US Tax 
Court if the taxpayer files a claim within ninety days of receiving a notice 
of deficiency from the Service.105 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act to be the 
expressed opinion of Congress that the Service should be provided 
significant discretion without judicial oversight to most expeditiously 
collect federal revenue.106  Additionally, the Court recognizes a need to 
protect the Service from litigation before a suit for a refund.107 
The Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits an action 
challenging a Service EO determination.  In Bob Jones University v. Simon, 
the Court reviewed a revocation of charitable exempt status by the 
Service.108  The Court held that as long as the Service appeared to be 
engaged in a good faith effort to enforce the law, there was no reason to 
upset the great deference that Congress grants to the Service in its 
revenue-enforcing activities.109  Only upon a showing of both 
“irreparable injury” and that “it is clear that under no circumstances 
could the [g]overnment ultimately prevail” could a suit for injunction 
                                                 
98 See Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 262–63 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S9XU-N9D3 
(explaining the appeal process when an exempt status is denied by EO Determinations or 
EO Technical). 
99 Id. at 262. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 263. 
102 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012). 
103 Id. § 7422(e). 
104 Id. § 7422(d). 
105 Id. § 6213(a). 
106 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 726–27. 
109 Id. at 740. 
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proceed.110  The Court acknowledged that the regime adopted by 
Congress was a harsh one.111  “The degree of bureaucratic control that, 
practically speaking, has been placed in the Service over those in 
petitioner's position is susceptible of abuse, regardless of how 
conscientiously the Service may attempt to carry out its 
responsibilities.”112  Nevertheless, the Court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the suit.113  The Taxpayer had a sufficient remedy 
though because it could pay a tax and challenge the determination 
through refund jurisdiction.114 
Since that time, Congress enacted section 7428 to provide charitable 
organizations a judicial procedure to contest a denial or revocation of 
exempt status.  Section 7428 provides that charitable organizations and 
certain cooperatives may challenge a denial or revocation of a 
determination in court.115  Section 7428 also provides this right to these 
same organizations if the Service has not acted on an application within 
270 days from the filing of the application if the organization has taken 
all timely steps to secure a determination.116  Before the passage of 
section 7428, the only opportunity charitable organizations had to 
challenge a Service determination was to pay a small tax, such as the 
employment tax, and file for a refund on the basis that the organization 
did not owe the tax because it was exempt from tax as a charitable 
organization.117  Congress has not provided this right to any other 
exempt organization, including social welfare organizations.  These 
organizations still have access to court to contest a denial by paying a 
small tax and then claiming a refund on the basis that the organization is 
exempt from taxation.118 
4. Concluding Thoughts on the Determination System 
There is little positive law to guide the Service’s management of the 
determination process.  In the case of the Tea Party organizations that 
                                                 
110 Id. at 737 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). 
111 Id. at 749. 
112 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749–50. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 746. 
115 See 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) (2012) (examining the statute for the right to judicially 
challenge a denial or revocation of a determination). 
116 Id. § 7428(b)(2). 
117 See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 727–28, 731 (1974) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act 
prevented the university from seeking a declaratory judgment that the revocation of its 
exempt status as a charitable organization was improper without a showing of irreparable 
injury and lack of a reasonable interpretation of the Code). 
118 Id. at 746. 
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applied for social welfare status, there is no positive law requiring the 
Service to administer an application system at all.  However, the Service 
employs extensive procedures to manage the exempt organization 
determination process, and it discusses how it manages that function on 
an annual basis.  Furthermore, no Service procedure appears to prohibit 
the use of a name in its screening process.  In fact, the evidence is that in 
high profile and other cases it has encouraged the use of names. 
Part II.B briefly turns to the examination function.119  The primary 
purpose of the Part is to describe the efforts the Service uses to identify 
taxpayer returns to review for audit.120  While there has been little effort 
to consider the appropriateness of those particular processes from a 
justice standpoint, this Article operates from a presumption that these 
selection methods, so long used, are widely accepted as reasonable 
methods.  Additionally, it traces the history of Service and Congressional 
recognition of how to best use the scarce resources of the Service. 
B. Examination Process 
In the examinations process, the Service examines every return 
through an automated process, but picks organizations and individuals 
through a screening procedure to subject to the closer scrutiny of an 
audit.  The Service uses a variety of means to select taxpayers for audit 
such as random statistical selection, known as the Discriminate 
Inventory Function System (“DIF score”), failure of certain Service 
information reporting to match up, and related party examinations.121 
1. Very Short History of Examination 
The first US income tax, enacted in 1862, required the newly-created 
office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to use independent 
assistant assessors to collect and review every return of every person.122  
Quoting from a guide for assessors from the time, Professor Camp notes 
that “[e]ach assistant needed to ‘have continually before him an intimate 
                                                 
119 See infra Part II.B (reviewing the Service’s examination process). 
120 See infra Part II.B (describing the efforts used by the Service to select taxpayer returns 
for audit). 
121 See, e.g., IRS Audits, I.R.S. (June 23, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/IRS-Audits, archived at http://perma.cc/P58N-XXPA 
(providing a description of selection methods); Tax-Exempt Status for Your Org., I.R.S. PUB. 
557, 2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4M5G-GJXE (explaining the Service’s exempt organizations select check). 
122 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FED. INCOME TAX 527 (1940); see Theory and 
Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 229–34 (discussing the development of this 
process).  This Part draws heavily from Bryan Camp’s work. 
2015] An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair 473 
knowledge of his division, with it shops, factories, storehouses and 
stores . . . .  Each assistant also needed to know ‘every person in his 
division who may be liable to license duty or income assessment.’”123  
There were 300 employees in Washington, D.C. and 3000 in the field to 
carry out this work.124  Employees in the central office would review the 
work of the assessors in the field, but the system was controlled in the 
field by the personal assessments of the assistants.125  Whether the 
Service was truly effective at accomplishing this personal collection goal 
is unclear. 
The 1913 income tax quickly made clear that the Service could not 
realistically personally review every return.  Evidence shows that as 
early as World War I the quantity of returns overwhelmed the abilities of 
the staff of the Service; the employees could not manage the onslaught.126  
The law still required mostly D.C.-centric assessors to review all returns 
and assess taxes by June 30.127  However, all they were really able to do 
was to check for mathematical errors.128  The Service estimated at the 
time that approximately 5% of the individual returns and 15% of the 
corporate returns should have been investigated more thoroughly.129 
The workforce with this new income tax stayed relatively stable, but 
the number of returns increased exponentially.  In 1915, the Service 
employed a workforce of 520 employees in Washington, D.C. and about 
4200 outside of Washington.130  These employees reviewed around 
500,000 returns that year.131  In 1917, taxpayers submitted more than 3.5 
million returns.132  The agency found itself with a backlog of returns such 
that by 1923 they were behind by 3 million returns.133 
To manage this backlog, the Service tripled its workforce by 1919.134  
It also shifted some assessment work to assistant collectors in the field.135  
                                                 
123 Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 232 (quoting Treasury 
Circular 22, reprinted in CHARLES N. EMERSON, EMERSON’S INTERNAL REVENUE GUIDE 17 
(Samuel Bowles & Co., Springfield, Mass., 1867)). 
124 Id. at 233. 
125 See id. (explaining the tax process). 
126 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 528 (noting the difficulties the Service 
experienced with personally reviewing every return). 
127 See Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 169 (1915) (setting out the rules for 
assessments). 
128 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 529 (addressing the clerks’ general lack of 
accounting and legal proficiency). 
129 See id. (discussing statistics reported by the Service). 
130 I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK:  A CHRONOLOGY 89 (1993). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 530 (explaining the dramatic increase in 
returns). 
134 Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 238. 
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Although at the time the idea of an audit lacked specificity, during this 
period the idea arose that some returns should be subject to more 
scrutiny than others, that is, some returns would be audited.136  The 
Service processed and reviewed all returns to determine whether they 
should be accepted, but the Service did not audit all returns.137  The 1918 
changes to assessment procedure codified this idea of audit.138  Before 
1918, the law required the Service to make an assessment before any tax 
was due and owing, but after 1918 taxpayers had to pay the tax liability 
reflected on their returns when the returns were due.139  The law now 
required the Service to assess the taxes “as soon as practicable.”140 
This distinction between audit and return processing became 
complete during World War II.  During the war, the taxpaying 
population went from 7.6 million in 1939 to 42 million in 1945.141  The 
Service increased its workforce from 22,000 employees to almost 
50,000.142  Professor Camp notes that whereas agents used to interact 
primarily with sophisticated taxpayers associated with businesses who 
kept good records, agents began to interact with the members of the 
public, who kept little in the way of records at all.143  By the 1950s it was 
apparent that the Service could not review every return personally as 
had been initially established.144  Professor Camp notes this time as the 
beginning of automatic data processing and the treatment of individuals 
not as individuals but as part of broad batches of taxpayers.145 
The moral of the story is that the Service maintains a system where it 
can only enforce the law by picking and choosing a small sample of 
returns in the hopes of deterring other individuals from filing improper 
returns.  This is typically referred to as the voluntary income tax 
system.146  The accuracy and correctness of the system relies a great deal 
upon an expectation that taxpayers will follow the law.  It backs that up 
by auditing a small number of taxpayers, and by sometimes prosecuting 
                                                                                                             
135 See id. (discussing the increase in workers). 
136 See id. at 239 (addressing the changing goals surrounding tax returns). 
137 Id. 
138 See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1082–83 (1919) (showing the 
requirement of a taxpayer to pay tax with a return). 
139 Id. 
140 Revenue Act of 1918, § 250, 40 Stat. at 1083. 
141 See Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 240 (discussing the 
significant change in the number of tax payers over six years). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 241. 
145 Id. at 240–41. 
146 See Camp, supra note 15, at 5. 
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violators with criminal sanctions.147  This means though that the Service 
must make decisions daily about whom to review more closely.  As a 
result, the law will be enforced in a selective manner.  Audit results in 
the Service treating similarly situated taxpayers differently.  Part II.B.2 
reviews the little that is known today about Service audit selection 
methods.148 
2. Current Examination Selection 
Today, there are a number of ways the Service might select a tax 
return for audit.  On the Service Small Business Self-Employed webpage, 
the Service provides the three main ways it selects returns for audit:  (1) 
computer screening using statistics (using a DIF score); (2) information 
reporting; and (3) related examinations.149  Other factors may affect the 
Service’s selection of returns for audit.  For instance, other audit triggers 
include a return demonstrating a taxpayer with significant wealth, 
referrals, notoriety, or certain deductions that the Service finds are 
subject to abuse.150 
a. DIF 
Developed in the 1950s when the Service began using the ADP 
process, a DIF score is based on a multi-factor computer process that 
allows the Service to determine that a particular return deviates too 
much from an expected range.151  By placing returns into batches or 
identical classes reflecting income or other characteristics, the Service is 
able to use the computer to detect significant variations from the norm.152  
Agents pick returns with high DIF scores for a quick examination to 
                                                 
147 In fact, it is no secret that the Service specifically targets individuals of a high profile 
nature in its criminal enforcement to have the greatest enforcement effect in this endeavor.  
Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265, 293 (2011). 
148 See infra Part II.B.2 (reviewing the Service’s audit selection methods). 
149 See IRS Audits, supra note 121 (explaining the three main methods the Service uses to 
select returns for audit). 
150 See DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 
97–98 (2d ed. 2008) (providing factors for consideration when the Service selects returns for 
audits). 
151 See id. at 95–96 (explaining DIF, which is a multi-factor computer process); see also 
Discriminant Index Function (DIF) Overview, IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-001-003.html#d0e258, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J5VW-5VH7 (setting out the types of DIF returns). 
152 See generally Discriminant Index Function (DIF) Overview, IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-001-003.html#d0e258, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J5VW-5VH7 (delineating the classes of DIF returns). 
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determine whether the return needs to go for a full audit.153  The agents 
also determine the type of examination the exam should undergo.154 
The formulae are secret and cannot be obtained via discovery or the 
Freedom of Information Act.155  The Service initially operated a program 
that allowed significant precision in its DIF score system.  However, the 
program, called the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(“TCMP”), apparently subjected taxpayers to significant annoyance.  For 
this reason, Congress forced the Service to shut the program down.156  
The Service ended the program in 1988, and some say that its shutdown 
has resulted in the DIF score being less reliable than it used to be.157  The 
Service now runs a program called the National Research Program, 
started in the 2000s to replace the TCMP program.158 
b. Information Reporting 
The second audit trigger is based on information from conflicting 
information returns.  The Service receives significant information from 
third-party payors.159  This information allows the Service to confirm the 
accuracy of information reported by taxpayers on their returns.160  For 
instance, employers file a W-2 form indicating how much income they 
paid an employee and how much tax they withheld; institutions like 
banks that pay interest must file a 1099-INT informing the Service how 
much interest a taxpayer received; corporations must file a 1099-DIV 
informing the Service how much in dividends a taxpayer received.  All 
of this vast information is placed into a computer and matched against 
taxpayer returns to find discrepancies.161  Where there is a discrepancy, a 
letter is triggered asking the taxpayer to explain the discrepancy.162  A 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2012) (stipulating the confidentiality and disclosure of 
returns and return information). 
156 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, CHALLENGES 
ASSOCIATED WITH COLLECTING COMPLIANCE DATA 12 (June 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/cocompda.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NYS8-
UGYC (explaining that the Service stopped using the TCMP in 1988). 
157  RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 156, 
at 10. 
158 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 156, 
at 1; see National Research Program (NRP), I.R.S. (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
National-Research-Program-%28NRP%29, archived at http://perma.cc/X643-A2MT 
(discussing the Service NRP and its plan to update its DIF system). 
159 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96. 
160 Id. 
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162 Id. 
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failure to explain, or a significant discrepancy, can result in an audit of 
the taxpayer.163  The evidence is that any income subject to information 
reporting is reported at a highly accurate level.164  Where there is no 
information reporting, income is not reported at a highly accurate 
level.165 
c. Related Examinations 
The third audit trigger is based on being a party related to a party 
that the Service is auditing.  Some refer to this third type of selection as 
selection by infection.166  On this matter, the Service states, “returns may 
be selected for audit when they involve issues or transactions with other 
taxpayers, such as business partners or investors, whose returns were 
selected for audit.”167  Thus, the Service takes into account information it 
receives from one return to identify other parties it may need to review.  
Even if the Service has no specific information that one of these other 
parties has violated the Code, to be complete, the Service pulls in each of 
the important parties to the audit.168  This could mean that if a closely 
held corporation’s return is examined, then the shareholders’ returns 
might be examined as well. 
3. Final Thoughts on Examination Process as it Relates to the 
Determinations Process 
The task set in this Article is to determine whether the IG had a 
proper legal or ethical basis for asserting that it was inappropriate for the 
Service to select an application for central review based on the 
applicant’s names.  The Service has suggested that it utilized the names 
of the Tea Party in screening applications to centralize review and to 
ensure uniformity.169  The history of the examination process illustrates 
that the Service regularly faces the problem of insufficient resources to 
manage its mandate.170  Because the Service receives so many returns 
                                                 
163 Id. at 96–97. 
164 Id. at 97 
165 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 97. 
166 Id. at 98. 
167 IRS Audits, supra note 121. 
168 See Examination of Returns, Appeal Rights, and Claims for Refund, I.R.S. PUB. 556, 3 (Sept. 
2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
2WJL-VKQR (“The information is evaluated for reliability and accuracy before it is used as 
the basis of an examination or investigation.”). 
169 Questions and Answers, supra note 58. 
170 See infra Part II.A (discussing the problems with the determinations process); see also 
GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION 1 (1987) (suggesting that most agencies appear 
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and does not have enough employees or resources to evaluate all 
returns, the Service must focus on only a small selected set of taxpayers.  
Additionally, while the Service picks returns in very structured ways 
based on numbers and reporting failures, some returns are picked 
because of names, for example in the case of related party audits.171  In 
those cases, the Service has identified an issue first, but then picks whom 
to audit based in part on the name.172  Arguably, the organizations with 
the Tea Party name were all related parties, and, as will be developed in 
Part II.C, the Service had reason to believe these organizations might not 
qualify for the status they were seeking.173 
C. What Happened in the Case of the Tea Party Organizations? 
To summarize the enormous amount of detail now available 
regarding the Tea Party matter, the Service explains that it began to see 
an uptick in applications for status as social welfare organizations in the 
years 2010 and 2011.174  The increase seemed to be associated with 
organizations engaged in political activities.175  The Service referred to 
this set of politically engaged social welfare organization applications as 
“Tea Party” cases.176  The Service suggested that the uptick occurred as a 
result of the Court’s Citizens United opinion.177  While all tax exempt 
organizations may engage in some politically related activities, in the 
case of social welfare organizations, the primary activity of the 
organization cannot be to intervene in a political campaign.178 
To handle this increase of applications of social welfare 
organizations that appeared to be engaging in some level of campaign 
intervention, the Service decided to “centralize” the applications.179  This 
meant that these applications were routed to agents who had experience 
                                                                                                             
to suffer from the problem of Congress providing a mandate too large for the resources 
provided). 
171 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 98. 
172 Id. 
173 See infra Part II.C (discussing the interrelation of hundreds of organizations registered 
with the Tea Party). 
174 Questions and Answers, supra note 58. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 See Paul Blumenthal, IRS Tea Party Targeting Came After Court Rulings Upended Agency 
Role, HUFF. POST (May 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/irs-tea-
party-targeting_n_3272849.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6JKK-HTQQ (discussing the 
large uptick in 501(c)(4) applications after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United). 
178 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (“The promotion of social welfare does not 
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or 
in opposition to any candidate for public office.”). 
179 Questions and Answers, supra note 58. 
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in reviewing politically active social welfare organizations so that the 
cases would be “worked consistently.”180  There is some discrepancy as 
to whether the initial decision was to focus on politically-engaged 
organizations or whether it was to focus on Tea Party-related 
organizations alone.  Some testimony indicates that some Service 
employees viewed the term Tea Party cases as a generic category, like 
someone might refer to coke as a generic term for soft drink.181  Other 
testimony seems to suggest that some employees understood in the early 
stage that they should be pulling and looking at only Tea Party-related 
organizations and should avoid looking at any others.182 
Over a part of the period of the audit performed by TIGTA, review 
agents selected 298 organizations for screening of political activities.183  
The IG report identifies that ninety-six of these 298 cases included “tea 
party,” “Patriot,” or “9/12” groups—all ideologically conservative.184  
The allegiance of the other 202 organizations is not definitively known, 
although some appear to be liberal, some conservative, and some do not 
appear to have a political allegiance at all.  The most troubling fact to 
TIGTA seemed to be that every organization with the “Tea Party” in the 
organization’s name ended up in this review group, but the same did not 
happen for every organization with the word “progressive” in its 
name.185 
The IG also objected to the length of time these organizations were 
subjected to review and to the excessive questions that these 
organizations faced.186  It is not clear whether the IG assessed how the 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 Blumenthal, supra note 177. 
182 Id. 
183 IG Report, supra note 2, at 10. 
184 Id. at 8. 
185 In a letter from the IG to Representative Levin on June 26, 2013, the IG explained that 
at the request of Representative Levin, the IG performed an additional audit of the 
applications that the IG had reviewed.  Letter from J. Russell George, Inspector General, to 
Sander M. Levin, Michigan Representative (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tigta_final_response_to_rep._levin_6.26.1
3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QS76-W8N9.  In that additional audit, the IG reviewed 
whether the Service had reviewed all organizations with the word “progress” or 
“progressive” in their titles.  Id.  The IG found that not all such organizations were 
subjected to greater scrutiny.  Id.  There was some confusion though about the use of the 
term “progressive.”  Some news reports suggested that the IG found that the Service had 
not subjected “progressive” organization to enhanced review of political activities.  Alan 
Framm, J. Russell George, No Sign Progressives Were Mistreated by IRS, HUFF. POST:  POLITICS 
(Aug. 27, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/progressives-
irs_n_3509983.html?, archived at http://perma.cc/T9EH-FEWE.  However, the only thing 
the IG said was that not every organization with the word “progressive” in its name was 
screened into the political activities basket.  Id. 
186 IG Report, supra note 2, at 8. 
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questions provided to these organizations compared in intrusiveness, 
but the IG did determine that on average, organizations that got placed 
into this review group experienced a longer wait time in obtaining an 
exemption letter than the average organization applying for 
exemption.187  Although the IG determined that the Service used 
inappropriate criteria, it found no evidence that the Service intentionally 
engaged in this activity.188  Its evidence pointed more strongly to some 
management failures to run an effective operation that maintained 
proper controls over the determination system. 
Importantly for the case made below, the IG found that the Service 
did not in fact operate with bias in its actions.189  It identified no one that 
appeared to be carrying out a scheme to enforce the law more harshly 
against conservative organizations.190 The Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations found the same.191 
III.  LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS 
This Part examines the rules that apply to social welfare 
organizations.  The ambiguity of the social welfare legal regime is 
relevant to the consideration of the discretion the Service exercised in 
this Tea Party affair.  It is a highly fact dependent inquiry.  The ability to 
compare many of similar type organizations that present similar facts 
can aid the regulator in making consistent judgments regarding 
exemption. 
Organizations described in section 501(c)(4) include civic leagues or 
organizations not organized for profit and operated exclusively for the 
promotion of social welfare.192  Although Congress used the words 
“operated exclusively,” the Treasury regulations require social welfare 
organizations to be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
common good and general welfare of the people of the community.”193  
That Treasury Regulations do not interpret the term “exclusively” 
literally, which is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  In 
Better Business Bureau, the Court stated that exclusively “plainly means 
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191 UNITED STATES S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, IRS AND TIGTA MGMT 
FAILURES RELATED TO SECTION 501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1 
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that the presence of a single non-educational purpose, if substantial in 
nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or 
importance of truly educational purposes.”194 
The regulations state that a social welfare purpose includes working 
toward “bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.”195  
An organization is not considered to be exempt under section 501(c)(4) to 
the extent it provides benefits only to its members and not to the whole 
community.196  The Service acknowledged the significant lack of clarity 
as to the meaning of a social welfare purpose in a continuing 
professional education text when it referred to this category as a “catch-
all” for those beneficial organizations that it could not quite fit into the 
category of charitable.197 
Some early courts tried to define the term civic organization.  In 
United States v. Pickwick Electric Membership Corp., the court stated that 
civic organizations involve “citizens of a community cooperating to 
promote the common good and general welfare of people of the 
community.”198  Another court similarly defined civic organizations as a 
“movement of the citizenry or of the community.”199  Although this is a 
different phrase than social welfare, the idea of a civic organization is 
also an aid to determining whether an organization qualifies under 
section 501(c)(4). 
In 2009, about 9500 social welfare organizations reported holding 
almost $100 billion in assets, receiving approximately $85 billion in 
revenue, and incurring about $82.5 billion in expenses.200  Among the 
                                                 
194 Better Bus. Bureau of D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). 
195 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i); see also Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 
151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that civic “organization[s] must be a community movement 
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196 See, e.g., Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 
687 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding membership organization of plumbers that repaired potholes of 
streets only its members had an obligation to repair not operated for a social welfare 
purpose because “each member of the cooperative enjoys these economic terms precisely to 
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265 Fed. App’x. 650, 651 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding vision services health maintenance 
organization not organized for social welfare because it “benefits VSP’s subscribers rather 
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Community?  I.R.S. EXEMPT ORG. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR 1981, Ch. G, at 39 (1981), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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198 158 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1946). 
199 Comm’r v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814, 818 (4th Cir. 1962). 
200 SOI Tax Stats—Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Orgs. Statistics, I.R.S. (last updated Aug. 
12, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Charities-and-Other-Tax-Exempt-
Organizations-Statistics, archived at http://perma.cc/96UQ-X56A.SOI. 
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types of organizations that qualify as social welfare organizations are 
homeowners associations, health maintenance organizations, and many 
organizations that advocate for a particular cause.201 
A contribution to a social welfare organization is not deductible 
under section 170 of the Code; however, payments to social welfare 
organizations may be deductible under another Code section.202  For 
instance, a payment to a health maintenance organization for employee 
insurance may qualify for a medical expense deduction.203 
Whatever social welfare or civic means, people and institutions have 
long used social welfare organizations as a vehicle to advocate partisan 
positions.  For instance, in 1945 in Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. 
Commissioner, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that the operation of a radio station that was founded in 1928 to advocate 
“liberal or progressive” views established that the organization was 
operated for a social welfare purpose under the Code.204  Today, many 
individuals and groups establish social welfare organizations to educate 
the public on partisan issues and to lobby to promote a particular 
cause.205  In fact, charities often form social welfare organizations to 
conduct lobbying on their behalf.206  The Court explicitly approved of 
such partisan positions being advocated by social welfare organizations 
on behalf of charitable organizations in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation.207  Finally, the Service has stated that a social welfare 
                                                 
201 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 528(a) (2012) (qualifying many homeowner’s associations for 
income tax exemption). 
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organization may engage in lobbying as its sole activity as long as the 
activity is consistent with its exempt purpose.208 
Although it is not entirely clear why there is a qualitative difference 
for purposes of qualifying for a social welfare purpose between lobbying 
and intervening in a political campaign, the latter is not considered a 
valid social welfare purpose.  The Treasury regulations explicitly state 
that the “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political 
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office” explicitly does not advance a social welfare purpose.209  The Court 
implicitly accepted this idea in Taxation with Representation as well when 
it accepted that the exemption arrangement established in the Code 
allowed charitable activities to be conducted by charitable organizations, 
lobbying to be conducted by social welfare organizations, and campaign 
intervention through a PAC under section 527.210  According to Service 
guidance, a social welfare organization may intervene in a political 
campaign as long as intervening in a political campaign is not the 
organization’s primary activity.211 
However, knowing that a social welfare organization may not 
intervene in a campaign to promote social welfare tells us neither when 
an organization has intervened in a campaign nor when it has done too 
much intervening.  These two legal questions were at the heart of the Tea 
Party matter.  Until recently, our best understanding of what it meant to 
intervene in a campaign came from the definition of that term for 
charitable organizations.212  In that guidance, the Service provided 
twenty-one situations applying a facts and circumstances test to 
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determine whether an organization was advocating for or against a 
candidate for public office.213  Despite utilizing twenty-one different 
situations as a result of the adoption of a facts and circumstances test, 
there is still much room for administrative discretion.214  The Service 
recently proposed regulations to clarify this area of law for social welfare 
organizations.215  However, after receiving over 150,000 comments, the 
Service decided to reconsider its proposed regulations.216 
Determining whether an organization has intervened in a political 
campaign too much is no less ambiguous or contentious.  The initial 
problem is that the statute requires a social welfare organization to 
operate exclusively for a social welfare purpose.217  The regulation, 
however, interprets the term exclusively to mean primarily.218  The 
inquiry tends to focus on whether the activity evinces a dominant or just 
an ancillary purpose of the organization based on all the facts and 
circumstances.219  In Contracting Plumbers, a case focused on the 
exclusively standard of the statute, the court stated regarding the 
requirement that, “we adhere to the rule that the presence of a single 
substantial non-exempt purpose precludes exempt status regardless of 
the number or importance of the exempt purposes.”220  This standard 
leaves much room for administrative discretion. 
Unlike charitable organizations, most of which are required to file a 
notice via the Form 1023 to be recognized as exempt by the Service, there 
is no such notice that social welfare organizations are required to file to 
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be recognized as exempt organizations.221  A social welfare organization 
must annually file a Form 990 Return of an Exempt Organization.222 
An organization formed to be a social welfare organization that fails 
because it conducts too much political activity is classified as a taxable 
organization.223  If the organization follows correct procedures, however, 
by filing a notice with the Service, it would be exempt as a political 
organization under section 527.224  A section 527 political organization 
pays tax on its net investment income and is otherwise exempt from 
income tax.225  Importantly, no section in the Code makes it illegal to 
speak or organize.  Thus, the regime being enforced with respect to the 
Tea Party was simply a matter of classifying the organization as taxable 
or tax-exempt.  Additionally, and importantly in understanding a part of 
the political battle taking place with respect to the Tea Party matter, a 
section 527 organization must disclose its donors while a social welfare 
organization is not required to make this disclosure.226  Many political 
operatives choose to form social welfare organizations to advocate for 
campaigns in order to provide anonymity to their donors.227  The money 
placed into social welfare organizations for this purpose is often referred 
to as “dark money.”228 
In conclusion, while the law regarding social welfare organizations 
presents some administrative challenges for the Service, some amount of 
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political activity will disqualify a nonprofit from qualifying as a tax-
exempt social welfare organization.  Many of these organizations made 
their deep connection to politics by adopting the term party in their 
name.  Thus, the Service’s interest in the Tea Party organizations’ 
applications, very explicitly involved in politics, made sense. 
IV.  POSSIBLE LEGAL BASES FOR PROHIBITING THE USE OF NAMES AS A 
SCREENING PROCESS 
It is not entirely clear from the IG report why the IG believed that 
using names to screen applications violated any legal or ethical norm.  
The report suggests that using names could lead to a belief that the 
Service was operating in an impartial manner, and also that it could lead 
to inconsistent results.229  The IG does not identify a legal violation, but 
suggests primarily the violation of an ethical norm.230  The IG cites IRS 
Policy Statement 1-1, which provides “IRS employees accomplish this 
mission by being impartial and handling tax matters in a manner that 
will promote public confidence.”231  To try to examine in greater detail 
possible violations of legal or ethical norms in utilizing names, this 
Article considers three possible violations the IG might have intended. 
First, the IG might have believed the Service simply pulled 
organizations by name for closer review without taking into 
consideration whether they might have legally deserved a closer review 
(“first proposition”).  The IG stated that screening should only be based 
upon legal requirements rather than upon name or policy position.232  
This statement suggests the IG might believe the Service needs some 
probable-cause-like standard before subjecting an organization‘s 
application to closer scrutiny.  Under this view, the Service created 
inconsistent taxpayer results by randomly picking names to apply closer 
scrutiny. Agents operated much like airport security who randomly 
check individuals coming through security.  Or, perhaps, the Service 
unfairly subjected certain organizations to further scrutiny without 
reason to believe these organizations needed more scrutiny.  However, 
as discussed above, there is no evidence to support this proposition that 
the Service choice was entirely random in its selection of these 
organizations.  Thus, the analysis will focus primarily on the next two 
possible claims the IG might be making. 
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Second, the IG might have believed that pulling applications by 
name resulted in unequal enforcement of the law through inconsistent 
treatment of organizations applying for exempt status (“second 
proposition”).  By focusing on organizations by name, the Service may 
fail to apply the law to similarly situated organizations that are 
potentially violating the Code.  Under this theory, the problem with 
using the Tea Party name is that it means the Service will enforce the law 
in full against all Tea Party organizations, but it may miss some other 
similarly situated organizations.  Under this theory, the Service should 
never use names because it might result in an unequal enforcement of 
the law on any application type.  This violation assumes, in effect, that 
the Service must in the operation of its application system achieve what 
Judge Friendly called “the most basic principle of jurisprudence that ‘we 
must act alike in all cases of like nature.’”233 
Finally, the IG might have meant something similar but narrower.  
The IG might have meant that in this particular instance the use of 
names was improper because of potential constitutional implications 
(“third proposition”).  The Service picked conservative organizations by 
name to enforce a Code requirement that arguably involved the right to 
speak in our political system.  The IG might have meant that the use of 
names in this instance was particularly harmful because this could lead 
to unequal enforcement on an issue that cannot be subject to unequal 
enforcement.  Namely, this particular enforcement might have violated 
the First Amendment of the Constitution by subjecting some 
organizations to a different standard because of the content of their 
speech.234 
The first two propositions implicate sub-Constitutional duties of an 
agency, while the third proposition implicates Constitutional duties.  In 
the former, a court seeking to review such an action would need 
authority of a statute to do so.  In the latter, the Constitution provides the 
court that right.235  This Part will show that the Service can legally and 
ethically use names to screen applications.  The review validates the 
third proposition as the primary limitation on the use of names in 
screening applications.  Where the Service is enforcing a provision that 
implicates a fundamental constitutional right it must exercise greater 
care to ensure it is not engaged, nor does it look to be engaged, in some 
unequal enforcement of an important right.236 
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In considering these propositions, this Section considers legal and 
ethical thought that could have a bearing on the Service’s exercise of 
discretionary authority in using names to screen its application system.  
It is relatively easy to show whether a legal violation occurred or not.  
There is little positive law addressing that question. As noted, only 
under a very narrow constitutional case can it be shown that the use of 
names to screen applications can result in the violation of the law.237  It is 
not so easy to determine what should ethically guide the Service. 
In developing the ethical case, this Part takes a cue from the 
argument of Professor John Rohr that regime values should guide a 
bureaucrat in exercising discretion.238  Rohr makes the case that because 
bureaucrats are unelected officials, and they are making policy decisions 
in their discretionary actions, it is important that bureaucrats be trained 
to understand and apply important values of a governmental system.239  
He argues these important values are contained in public law.240  
Further, he contends that those principles can be found in Supreme 
Court opinions and can enrich our understanding of the ethical 
obligations of bureaucrats.241  This Article pushes this idea further and 
assumes that our laws adopted by Congress and their interpretation by 
the courts tell us something significant about regime values and 
therefore ethical principles that should guide bureaucrats in exercising 
discretion.  Thus, although there is neither a positive law, nor an agency 
rule, that would deem the use of names to violate law or ethics, we can 
extrapolate from general principles derived from these regime values. 
This Part also proceeds on the presumption that we grant discretion 
to bureaucrats to do justice in some sense.  As Professor Davis discussed 
in Discretionary Justice, there is a continuum over which we may view 
the scope of discretion provided to bureaucrats.242  We may give them 
total unfettered discretion or we may determine their every action 
through explicit rules.  Both poles present problems.  Total unfettered 
discretion leads to tyranny because the bureaucrat is accountable to 
neither law nor political repercussions.  However, law that guides every 
action prevents individualized justice.243  With rules that are too rigid, 
bureaucrats lose the ability to make adjustments where adjustments are 
called for. 
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Discretion is also granted to agencies particularly in the enforcement 
arena, because as the Court in Heckler v. Chaney recognized, the agency is 
likely the best judge of its limited resources to take enforcement action.244  
Given the significant lack of resources in carrying out the EO 
determinations function, we should grant the Service significant 
discretion in the enforcement decisions it makes.  This properly balances 
the two often-opposed values of individualized justice and group justice.  
Utilizing names as a screening method would appear to fit well within 
that discretionary space. 
A. What We Can Learn from Courts Reviewing Similar Agency Action 
In establishing the base legal and ethical case, this Article starts by 
asking the degree of latitude Congress and courts provide to an agency 
in carrying out its particular function.  We can establish that degree of 
latitude by considering the limits of jurisdiction provided to courts and 
the standard of review courts use to review that particular agency action.  
Those choices tell us something significant about where we as a society 
have struck the ethical and legal balance in the operation of a particular 
agency function.  As discussed in Part II.A.3, Congress grants the Service 
substantial space to carry out the collection of revenue.  It generally only 
grants court’s jurisdiction to review Service action after a taxpayer has 
paid a tax, or after the Service has assessed a tax.245  Additionally, the 
Anti-Injunction Act generally further prohibits a court from accepting 
jurisdiction before final Service action.246  This indicates a high regime 
value priority on the collection of revenue.  This choice arguably does 
not indicate a lack of concern for individualized rights, but it recognizes 
that if we focus too intensely on those individualized rights we will 
undermine fairness in a global sense.   
1. What Standard of Review Might a Court Use in the Tea Party 
Matter? 
Courts apply different levels of standard of review to agency action 
depending on the category of agency action.  Those standards of review 
were developed through the common law, but are now generally set by 
statute by the Administrative Procedure Act.247  The standard of review 
can run from de novo, when there is an explicit law defining agency 
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action, to no review at all, as is typical in the case of the question of 
whether or not to enforce the law in a particular case.248  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Service engages in 
informal adjudication when it reviews an application for a 
determination.249  A court reviewing factual and policy determinations 
made by an agency as part of an order from an informal adjudication 
reviews those decisions under the fairly minimal arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review.250  As the Supreme Court has stated, a 
reviewing court should make a “consideration of the relevant factors and 
whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . .  Although this 
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard 
of review is a narrow one.  The court is not empowered to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency.”251  Thus, courts and Congress believe 
agencies should have great leeway in conducting such informal 
adjudications.  Put another way, courts must generally accept a final 
result if it is a plausible result under the law. 
The oddity of trying to apply this standard to the Tea Party matter is 
that this is a standard that applies to the review of final agency action.252  
In the Tea Party matter, almost none of these organizations had yet 
received denials of exempt status.  But, courts typically look at decisions 
made as part of an informal adjudication after the agency has issued an 
order, not while administrative process is ongoing.253  A court reviewing 
agency action is generally concerned with whether the final answer is 
correct.  
Given that final action is typically necessary for judicial review, 
arguably, as long as the Service utilizes legitimate criteria when 
reviewing applications for exemption, its actions should be considered 
presumptively lawful.  This notion is akin to the Court’s holding in 
Heckler v. Chaney.  There, the Court established a presumption that an 
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce is immune from judicial 
review as a decision committed to complete agency discretion.254  The 
Court noted that great discretion is granted in the case of decisions not to 
enforce because an agency has limited resources and has to make 
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judgments about how to best marshal those resources.255  Furthermore, 
the activity of enforcement itself has long been considered core executive 
power.256  Both of these rationales would appear to apply in a similar 
manner to the use of names to screen applications.  In effect, the choice to 
screen applicants is to make judgments about whom to enforce the law 
against.  The Court’s holding in Hernandez, discussed in Part IV.A.2.b 
below, provides further support for the proposition of a presumption in 
favor of the Service in its enforcement choices with respect to reviewing 
applications.257 
The message contained in court and congressionally-placed limits on 
court jurisdiction to review Service action suggests problems with the 
first and second propositions.  Those propositions seem to significantly 
limit the discretion of the Service in carrying out its functions related to 
the collection of revenue.  That is inconsistent with the approach of 
courts and Congress.  
2. What Laws Might Specifically Apply to Prohibit the Use of Names to 
Screen Applications 
a. Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination 
A typical complaint against the regime of tax exemption is that it 
impermissibly restricts taxpayer’s First Amendment rights to speak.  The 
Code only provides exemption to certain nonprofits including social 
welfare organizations when they give up some of their rights to lobby or 
to intervene in a political campaign.258  Despite these claims of 
unconstitutionality, the Court has generally found the speech limitations 
applicable to tax exempt organizations to be constitutional.259  The Court 
has determined that tax exemption is a subsidy and no organization has 
a right to subsidized speech.260 
Nevertheless, the Service could, through how it administers the law, 
violate First Amendment rights.  If the Service prohibited the speech of 
some but permitted speech to others it would almost certainly violate the 
First Amendment.261  “Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, [the] government 
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
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acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views.”262 
There is no doubt that if the Service were to deny exempt status to 
organizations with conservative views solely because of those 
organizations’ conservative views, it would be acting unconstitutionally.  
This First Amendment approach begins to build a case to support the 
third proposition.263  It would not support the broader critique, however, 
laid out in the first or second propositions.264 
b. Selective Enforcement 
A claim of selective enforcement is the most direct legal claim that 
can be made against the Service for the use of names in screening 
applications.  The equal protection and due process clauses as applied to 
the federal government through the Fifth Amendment protect against 
federal government selective enforcement.265  However, the Court 
recognizes that agencies must make enforcement decisions and so sets 
the standard high for establishing a claim to selective enforcement.266  
“[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in 
itself a federal constitutional violation[,]” there must be a showing that 
“the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”267 
Although selective enforcement is a concept derived from criminal 
law, it has been applied in criminal tax and in civil tax audits, as well as 
to settlements.268  In Penn-Field Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax 
Court held, consistent with the principle stated by the Court in Oyler, 
that a taxpayer must prove:  (1) that other similarly situated taxpayers 
were not selected for audit for the same reason; and (2) that this 
discriminatory selection was based on race, religion, or based on the 
desire to prevent constitutional rights.269 
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Courts have evaluated a few selective enforcement cases associated 
with the charitable contribution deduction.  Those decisions are 
instructive in how a court might view this Tea Party matter.  In 
Hernandez v. Commissioner, for instance, the Service denied charitable 
contribution deductions claimed by Scientology adherents.270  The 
Scientologists claimed that the Service selectively enforced a limitation 
on charitable contributions against those who practiced the Scientology 
religion but not against other religious adherents.271  The Court 
acknowledged that the lower courts found no showing of “the type of 
hostility to a target of law enforcement that would support a claim of 
selective enforcement.”272  The Court also rejected the Scientologists’ 
arguments that they should be able to deduct payments for religious 
activities because other faiths got to do the same.273  The Court found 
first that the merits of deductions by other religious adherents were not 
before the Court.274  Secondly, the Court determined that the 
Scientologists’ requested deductions simply did not meet the 
requirements of the law to be entitled to a charitable contribution 
deduction, the Court dismissed the assertion.275  Without a showing of 
some animus and with an understanding that the Service appeared to be 
applying a reasonable interpretation of the law, the Court saw no claim 
for selective enforcement.276 
The selective enforcement analysis simply does not support a case 
that using names as a screening tool is prima facie problematic.  We 
again see courts provide the Service substantial discretion in carrying out 
its enforcement activities.  Selective enforcement applies only when:  (1) 
an agency does not apply similar treatment to similar organizations; and 
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deductible). 
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(2) a constitutional right is at stake.  In most contexts, neither prong will 
hold true.  The Service is not likely enforcing the law in a selective 
manner, and maybe more importantly for this analysis, it is unlikely that 
constitutional rights are at stake in most attempts to enforce the Code.  
However, where the Service is applying a law that implicates a 
Constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or free exercise of 
religion, as was arguably the case in the Tea Party matter, greater care is 
called for.  This suggests a regime value that from an ethical standpoint 
should guide the Service in administering its application system. 
There are legitimate reasons the Service might choose to screen 
organizations based on name.  An attempt to achieve uniformity of result 
is a legitimate reason to screen on the basis of name.  Where 
organizations connected are complex, or present complex or challenging 
questions to the Service, the use of names to ensure evenhanded 
enforcement with respect to those organizations seems axiomatic.  
Additionally, the use of a name to identify replicated organizations that 
the Service has reason to believe are violating a Code section should also 
provide a legitimate basis for screening on the basis of name.  The key 
for the Service for properly using names under selective enforcement 
guidance would be to first ask whether a particular Code section in the 
way it is being enforced implicates a Constitutional right.  If it does, then 
the Service should work to establish a record of uniform treatment to all 
organizations subject to enforcement under that particular Code 
section.277  This Section most directly undermines any support for the 
first or second proposition and supports in full the third. 
c. Duty of Consistency 
This Section considers an only tangentially related subject.  
However, it is important because it seems likely that this theory 
underlies the IG’s concern regarding the manner of screening in the Tea 
Party cases.  Some courts have found that the Service has a duty of 
consistency.278  The duty of consistency is based on Justice Frankfurter’s 
announced principle that the “Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax 
another without some rational basis for the difference.”279  This theory is 
closely related to the selective enforcement cases above; however, under 
                                                 
277 This approach could present significant resource challenges too—as the Service comes 
upon such enforcement challenges, it should reconsider its approach to the issue. 
278 See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(referring to Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, where he discusses equal tax 
treatment). 
279 Id. 
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this version, there is no need for a constitutional right to be at stake.280  
Thus, were we to extend this theory to the question of the Service using 
names to screen applications, we might be able to support the second 
proposition, and maybe even the first. 
In the classic duty of consistency case, the Service issued a private 
letter ruling to Remington stating that Remington did not owe tax on the 
sale of certain machines.281  IBM asked for the same ruling because it sold 
the same type of machines, but the Service denied IBM’s request.282  The 
Claims Court determined that it could review the decision of the Service 
for an abuse of discretion.283  Finding that "[e]quality of treatment is so 
dominant in our understanding of justice that discretion, where it is 
allowed a role, must pay the strictest heed," the Court held that the 
Service abused its discretion by not treating IBM in the same way it 
treated Remington.284 
This case has not been widely followed.  Congress and courts 
recognize the Herculean task that maintaining absolute consistency 
would mean given the available Service resources.285  For instance, Judge 
Friendly has stated, “[w]hile even-handed treatment should be the 
Commissioner's goal, perfection in the administration of such vast 
responsibilities cannot be expected.  The making of an error in one case, 
if error it was, gives other taxpayers no right to its perpetuation.”286  
Furthermore, as the Claims Court held in a case soon after the IBM 
matter: 
It is a settled principle of law that the United States is 
not bound by the unauthorized acts of it agents, that it is 
not estopped to assert the lack of authority as a defense, 
and that persons dealing with an agent of the 
                                                 
280 See Richard A. Epstein, What Do We Mean by the Rule of Law?, N.Z. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
Aug. 2005, at 2–3 (stating that similarly situated individuals should be treated similarly, 
avoiding arbitrary and capricious decisions). 
281 Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 924–25 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
282 Id. at 929. 
283 Id. at 920. 
284 Id. 
285 See, e.g., Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing 
the near impossibility of absolute consistency). 
286 Id. (citations omitted); see Wagner v. United States, 387 F.2d 966, 968 (providing that 
the Commissioner may change a former practice if he believes it is wrong); Snowden v. 
Hughes, 320 U.S 1, 15 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The Constitution does not 
assure uniformity of decisions or immunity from merely erroneous action, whether by the 
courts or the executive agencies of a state.”). 
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government must take notice of the limitations of his 
authority.287 
Scholars recognize that courts apply the duty of consistency 
inconsistently.  As pointed out by Professor Johnson, most cases limit the 
IBM and Remington precedent to situations where two conditions are 
present:  (1) two taxpayers are in competition; and (2) the taxpayer 
denied a favorable ruling claims the Commissioner abused his discretion 
by failing to apply a new legal position only prospectively.288  Professor 
Johnson refers to three principal duty of consistency views:  (1) a “strong 
duty”; (2) “no duty”; and (3) a “weak duty.”289  Under the strong duty 
view, even if the Service position being asserted is the correct state of the 
law, a court will find for the taxpayer if the Service practice has been 
contrary to the state of the law and favorable to the taxpayer.290  Under 
the no duty view, while there may be some moral or ethical compulsion 
that the Service treat taxpayers similarly, such a duty is not judicially 
enforceable.291  Finally, under the weak duty views, courts either believe 
that the duty only applies under certain circumstances, or the remedy 
does not necessarily mean the taxpayer wins.292 
What is important, however, is to distinguish consistency of result 
from consistency of process.  The case law and Professor Johnson’s 
scholarship concerns the former and not the latter.  First, given the level 
of discretionary authority the Service has in the area of enforcing 
exemption, under even the weak level of duty of consistency, the Service 
probably has a duty to treat taxpayers as similarly as possible.  It should 
make every effort to apply the law consistently to inspire taxpayer 
confidence in the impartiality of the Service.  However, the duty of 
consistency has nothing to say about enforcement discretion of the 
Service. 
Second, a duty of consistency applies only in situations where the 
Service provides a final positive decision to one group and denies it to 
another.  The use of names in screening organizations does not do this.  
                                                 
287 Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558, 562 (Ct. C1. 1965). 
288 See The Selective Enforcement of Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, supra note 268, at 
578 (citing Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2001)) (noting the two limited 
conditions where the IBM and Remington precedent are applicable). 
289 Id. at 580. 
290 See, e.g., Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129 (1979) (holding that even though 
the state of the law meant that the value of flights of family members should be included in 
income, because the Service had a practice of not treating this as income, the court rejected 
the Service’s position in the case). 
291 The Selective Enforcement of Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, supra note 268, at 
583. 
292 Id. at 584. 
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Using names to screen for organizations does not implicate the question 
of whether the Service is applying the same precedent.  The duty of 
consistency puts a premium on consistency of result.  Arguably, if the 
Service does not utilize names as a means of screening applicants that 
are related, it likely increases inconsistency of result within that group of 
organizations.  If it does use names, however, it may at times treat the 
named organization differently than it treats non-named organizations, 
but only in process, not in result.  As a result of Service resources, there 
is likely to be a lack of consistency of process treatment no matter what 
direction the Service takes.  Arguably, however, that the use of names 
should ultimately result in greater consistency of result, which is what 
should be the concern.  By increasing the expertise of its staff with 
particular organizations and issues, the Service should be pushing closer 
to the underlying goal of all of the duty of consistency cases—the fair 
treatment of taxpayers by a consistent application of the law.  Thus, 
support for only the third proposition is to be found in the duty of 
consistency line of thought. 
3. Other Considerations 
The following topics are tangential considerations regarding 
employee discretion and the use of names for screening that help to 
further the support for the third proposition.293  These also are items that 
need to at least be considered as relevant to the Tea Party matter. 
a. Application of 1998 Restructuring Act Principles 
Congress has significantly restructured the Service four times.294  The 
complaints that the Service can never shake are that it is secretive, 
inefficient, and mistreats taxpayers.295  All three complaints are found in 
the Tea Party matter.  These complaints also inspired the last 
restructuring of the Service, and, thus, it is important to at least consider 
the impact that the restructuring should have had on the way the Service 
operated in this instance.296 
In the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998 (“Reform Act”), Congress restructured the Service to remedy what 
                                                 
293 See infra Part IV.A.3.a–b (applying the 1998 Restructuring Act principles and 
analyzing unnecessary examinations). 
294 Thorndike, supra note 11, at 718. 
295 Id. 
296 See infra notes 297–300 and accompanying text (explaining the Reform Act of 1998). 
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it saw as employee abuses of taxpayers.297  The Reform Act broadly 
worked to change Service organization and management, mode of 
Congressional oversight, electronic filing, and most important for this 
part, created new taxpayer protections and rights.298  Of importance to 
the consideration of this Article, the Act created what are often referred 
to as the Ten Deadly Sins of a Service employee.299  These sins result in 
automatic termination of an employee.300  Thus, are any of the Ten 
Deadly Sins applicable to the case of a Service employee screening 
applications? 
The sins most likely implicated include three, six, and ten.  Deadly 
Sin Three prohibits “with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, 
or other employee of the Internal Revenue Service, the violation of (A) 
any constitutional right or (B) any civil right established under certain 
specified statutes, such as the Civil Rights Acts.”301  Deadly Sin Six 
involves the willful violation of the Code or regulations or Service 
policies to retaliate or harass a taxpayer.302  Finally, Deadly Sin Ten 
prohibits the threat of an audit to extract political gain or benefit.303 
There is nothing in the use of names to screen applications that 
would suggest a prima facie violation of any of the Deadly Sins.  
Screening could rise to that level, but again, there would need to be some 
animus in the decision of the Service to use the names for some ulterior 
motives.  In the vast majority of cases, it seems unlikely that Service 
employees would use names in this manner.  Nevertheless, in using 
names in the screening process, the Service may want to impose some 
checks to ensure that the names are not being used for improper 
purposes.  The IG made what is probably a good suggestion in its report 
that the BOLO listing should be approved at a higher level than in the 
Cincinnati office.304 
                                                 
297 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998); see, e.g., Thorndike, supra note 11, at 765 
(stating that Congress reformed the IRS in 1998). 
298 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N RELATING TO THE IRS 
AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 1 (May 4, 2001), 
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-33-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6X78-5X8Z. 
299 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 26 U.S.C. § 7804 
(2012). 
300 Id. § 7804(b)(3). 
301 Id. § 7804(b)(6). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. § 7804(b)(10). 
304 IG Report, supra note 2, at 10. 
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b. Unnecessary Examinations 
Section 7605(b) prohibits the Commissioner from conducting 
unnecessary examinations.305  The rule regarding unnecessary 
examinations does not apply to the determinations function because the 
latter is not an examination.306  It seems reasonable to conclude, however, 
that the law regarding unnecessary examinations could at least be 
ethically instructive to Service agents managing the determinations 
process.  What we find again is strong support for the third proposition. 
The leading case on section 7605(b) is United States v. Powell, where 
the Court held that the idea of necessity within section 7605(b) did not 
contemplate a showing of probable cause to conduct an examination for 
fraud.307  The Court considered the history of the statute and concluded 
that, while Congress enacted it to ensure that the Service needed to 
conduct an examination, it did not intend to import a particularly high 
burden for the Commissioner.308  The Court’s discussion of that history is 
instructive: 
Congress recognized a need for a curb on the 
investigating powers of low-echelon revenue agents, 
and considered that it met this need simply and fully by 
requiring such agents to clear any repetitive examination 
with a superior.  For us to import a probable cause 
standard to be enforced by the courts would 
substantially overshoot the goal which the legislators 
sought to attain.  There is no intimation in the legislative 
history that Congress intended the courts to oversee the 
Commissioner's determinations to investigate.309 
The Court’s guidance in Powell is that the Service should have 
substantial latitude in determining what and how much to examine.310  It 
seems reasonable to believe that in the determinations process, such 
latitude should be granted as well.  In that case, it seems perfectly 
acceptable to believe that the Service could use names to screen 
applications in ways mentioned above:  (1) to achieve uniformity; or (2) 
where there is concern that a particular name may be associated with 
                                                 
305 § 7605(b). 
306 JOHN A. TOWNSEND, FEDERAL TAX PROCEDURE 256 (2d ed. 2013). 
307 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964). 
308 Id. at 53–54. 
309 Id. at 55–56. 
310 Id. 
500 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
violations of the Code.  Thus, again this provides no support for any of 
the propositions beside the third proposition. 
V.  APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO THE TEA PARTY SITUATION 
A. The Legal and Ethical Case 
This final Part considers how the above principles should apply to 
the actual Tea Party matter.  Unlike the IG Report, this Part takes into 
consideration the management of Service resources.  In the Tea Party 
matter, the Service made a decision about its resources and the law it 
enforces.311  As established in Part II, Service resources are scarce and the 
Service has to make judgments regarding which applications to provide 
a closer review.312  Additionally, the agency has individuals with the 
unique knowledge of the organization and its goals that place the agency 
in the best position to make these calls. 
As the analysis in Part IV demonstrated, the primary theory that is 
potentially applicable to the Tea Party matter is a theory of selective 
enforcement.313  A first observation is that the Service made no final 
determinations regarding the Tea Party organizations.  The selective 
enforcement theme is used to attack a final negative determination 
generally, not typically an ongoing investigation.  Thus, a question of 
selective enforcement does not have great application to these cases 
unless the Service should deny the Tea Party organizations while 
granting such status to similarly situated liberal organizations.  While 
procedure on the margins is important, there should be a presumption of 
legitimate process where the Service gets to the right result. 
If the Service issued denials in the Tea Party matter it would still be 
hard for a plaintiff to mount a successful selective enforcement case.  The 
first step calls for a conclusion that the Service did not treat other 
organizations in a similar manner.  Here, the fact that only about one 
third of the organizations identified in the audit were conservative 
organizations makes it difficult to get past the first step of the United 
States Tax Court’s Penn-Field test for selective enforcement.314  
Additionally, the evidence is that the Service in a similar time period 
selected for review and issued denials to a Democratic women’s 
                                                 
311 See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing Heckler’s proposition that the 
Service is the best judge of its limited resources). 
312 See supra Part II (providing information on the responsibilities and resources of the 
Service for the determinations process). 
313 See supra Part IV (analyzing the legal bases for the issues with the determinations 
process). 
314 See supra note 269 and accompanying text (providing the test from Penn-Field). 
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organization.315  Thus, on the basis of the evidence before the public, 
there is no evidence that the Service is applying the law in its final 
determinations in an inconsistent manner. 
As for the second step, the requirements of section 501(c)(4) prohibit 
some political activity.316  Thus, a case can be made that its enforcement 
at least implicates a constitutional right—the right to free speech and free 
association.  However, nothing in the determination process stops an 
organization from speaking.  The Service is only trying to determine a 
tax status and imposes no restrictions on speech.  The only question is 
whether the organization is taxable or tax-exempt.  Organizations 
willingly submit applications to the Service to be recognized as 
organizations exempt from income tax.  Further, as the Court has 
recognized, there is no right to exemption from income tax.317  Thus, 
while these cases touched on a constitutional right, the contention that 
these cases specifically impacted a constitutional right is weak.  Thus, a 
legal case that the Service might have selectively enforced the law 
against the Tea Party groups is weak. 
However, as established in Part III, US regime values suggest a 
strong ethical obligation on the part of Service employees to act with a 
high standard of care on a case that implicates a constitutional right.318  
Although the standard for a legal claim to selective enforcement should 
likely be higher, given the universal immediate response to the idea that 
the Service targeted the Tea Party, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
this is a sufficient enough connection to a constitutional right for ethical 
purposes.  There is ample evidence that the Service did not operate with 
a high degree of care as it managed the Tea Party cases.  While the 
Service appears to have put some significant amount of resources to 
work on these cases, the Service employees tended to manage them 
sloppily.  There was a lack of clarity in instruction from management, 
and a tendency to forget about cases and take far too long in coming to a 
                                                 
315 See Stephanie Strom, 3 Groups Denied Breaks by the IRS are Named, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/business/advocacy-groups-
denied-tax-exempt-status-are-named.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NG2R-TMTS 
(detailing the story of the denial of social welfare organization status to three Democratic 
women’s organizations); Joan Walsh, Meet the Group the IRS Actually Denied:  Democrats!, 
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the_irs_actually_revoked_democrats/, archived at http://perma.cc/8BC5-T2LF (detailing 
how the Service systematically denied and pulled exemptions from this Democratic 
women’s group seeking status as social welfare organizations). 
316 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). 
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follow to be granted an exemption). 
318 See supra Part III (discussing the ethical obligations of Service employees and the 
higher standard of care expected of them). 
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decision.  Additionally, the questions asked were at times overly 
intrusive.  Furthermore, the Service sloppily managed a record of its 
efforts to manage liberal and conservative organizations with equal care. 
The Service should establish a record of care of enforcement when 
managing cases associated with political activity to reestablish integrity 
in the determinations process.  The Service could consider implementing 
this into its procedures in the IRM or in an annual revenue procedure.  
Additionally, the Service might consider adding to its annual training a 
discussion of ethics from a Constitutional perspective, rather than from 
the very rule based method it annually utilizes. 
This analysis leaves a few questions for the Service to consider as it 
manages its Determinations Process.  First, when the Service is screening 
for political advocacy organizations in its computer system, should it be 
forced to utilize a roughly “equal” number of tag-words referring to 
conservative and liberal organizations?  My sense is that this would be a 
good practice on the part of the Service.  This could help establish a 
record of evenhandedness.   
Second, what if there is good reason to think that conservative 
organizations are making use of an organizational structure much more 
than liberal organizations—may the Service be permitted to focus more 
on conservative tag-words provided that it offers a sufficient justification 
for that choice?  This is really related to the first question.  Perhaps it 
should be phrased as, if it appears the Service is enforcing the law in 
greater number against conservative organizations, as was the apparent 
appearance in the Tea Party matter, is there a way for the Service to 
insulate itself from claims of selective enforcement.  It seems the high 
degree of care would mandate what was stated as to the first question—
that is, the Service should make strong efforts to ensure it maintains a list 
of all organizations from all political persuasions to ensure it is picking 
up the widest diversity of political organization possible. 
Finally, should different constitutional standards give rise to 
different standards of justifications?  In other words, does the Service 
have more leeway to target, say, a subset of religious organizations as 
opposed to a subset of political organizations, or race-based 
organizations?  Given that the premise of this Article is that the standard 
of care for regular enforcement is one standard and the standard for 
enforcement when impinging on a constitutional right is higher, it stands 
to reason that the Service should apply different standards depending on 
the constitutional right involved.  It probably should never screen on 
race-based standards.  However, fortunately, and correctly, there are no 
race-based standards for qualifying for tax-exemption.  Interestingly in 
the realm of religion, Congress has already provided significant 
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protections to churches.319  Congress believes churches at least should be 
provided some extra protection from the Service. 
B. Recommendations Regarding the IG Based on This Analysis 
The IG, a creature of the 1998 Tax Restructuring Act, fills an 
important role.  It helps provide critical analysis of Service functions.  It 
is an important independent voice that can protect taxpayers from 
improper Service action, and can provide the Service a picture of 
problems that the organization is facing.  However, in exercising this 
role, the IG needs to be more careful in anchoring its claims of violations 
by the Service in its proper legal, ethical, and policy context.  The report 
on the Tea Party failed to anchor a major claim in anything more than a 
Service platitude.  It also badly advised the Service in future action.  
Failing to use names in screening applications will lead to less 
consistency by the Service rather than more.  The IG simply failed to 
consider all of the factors that needed to be balanced in issuing its report. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
What mandate does Congress and constitutional law set for the 
Service in operating the EO determinations process?  Arguably, it is to as 
quickly as reasonably possible correctly assess the applications it 
receives for exemption.  The IG Report raises the question of what 
methods are appropriate to accomplish this function.  What could guide 
the Service in this question?  The IG suggests that it must use the 
standards from the Code and regulations in making screening decisions.  
However, given the Service’s limited resources and heavy workload, this 
seems more likely to result in greater harm to uniformity and fairness of 
treatment than the system that the Service appears to have been utilizing.  
Eliminating a simple tool of allowing related organizations to be easily 
identified by name and considered together by the same agents seems 
more likely to result in non-uniform results. 
This review of authorities overwhelmingly suggests that both 
Congress and courts believe a high degree of discretion should be 
granted to the Service as it collects revenue.  Tax exemption directly 
implicates the collection of revenue since each organization granted 
exempt status is freed from having to contribute coin to the general 
welfare of the United States.  Determination of exempt status is a 
necessary part of the system of revenue collection.  In carrying out that 
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function, the Service certainly has a duty to enforce the laws as 
impartially as possible.  The use of names to screen applications in most 
instances should not suggest that the Service is acting impartially.  The 
lesson of the Tea Party matter though is that in the case of political 
activity, the use of names may cause some to question the partiality of 
Service employees.  This is not inconsistent with the way courts view 
selective enforcement.  Where enforcement touches on a constitutional 
right, courts are more likely to find impermissible enforcement actions.  
This suggests that where the Service is enforcing a provision, such as the 
prohibition on too much political campaign activity, that the Service 
should establish a record that utilizing a name will result in more fair 
enforcement than not using a name.  Additionally, it should ensure that 
it is making every effort to utilize names widely within that field of 
enforcement.  Finally, while the Service engaged in no legal violation in 
utilizing names to screen the applications, its bumbling management of 
the application of a law that touches on important constitutional rights 
failed to meet ethical standards. 
